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OWNERSHIP AS A DETERMINING FACTOR IN THE 
EVOLUTION OF EFFICIENCY  
 
ABSTRACT 
Taking into consideration the privatisation policy that has emerged in recent decades, 
significant researches have been carried out to compare the efficiency of public and private 
companies. However, there is a drop regarding the evolution of these companies over the 
years. In view of this, the present research tries to deal with the analysis of efficiency from a 
dynamic perspective, and to evaluate the process of changes occurring between the starting 
point (1990) and the finishing point (1998). 
The methodology is Indexes of Malmquist.  Empirical data show that privatised enterprises 
have improved its technical efficiency more than private enterprises. Public enterprises are 
the firms that have improved least in this way.  
Finally a complementary analysis considers if determinant factors, such exports, R&D., 
presence of workers contracted, or human c Indexepital contribute to improve the efficiency. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: privatisation, efficiency, Indexes of Malmquist 
 
RESUMEN 
En los últimos años se han realizado significativas investigaciones con el objetivo de comparar 
la eficiencia de empresas públicas y privadas, como consecuencia, de la política de la 
privatización que ha emergido en décadas recientes.  
Sin embargo los análisis encargados de evaluar la evolución de la eficiencia en las distintas 
categorías de empresas resultan notablemente menores. Como consecuencia, el presente 
trabajo intenta afrontar el estudio de la eficiencia desde una perspectiva dinámica, y evaluar 
el proceso de los cambios que ocurren entre el punto de partida (1990) y el punto final 
(1998).  La metodología empleada gira en torno a los Índices de Malmquist. Los datos 
empíricos demuestran que las empresas privatizadas han mejorado su eficiencia técnica más 
que las entidades privadas.  Las empresas públicas, por su parte,  son las firmas que han 
mejorado peor comportamiento han tenido en este contexto. 
Finalmente se plantea un análisis complementario en el que se trata de determinar en qué 
medida contribuyen a esta evolución factores como la I+D. las exportaciones, la presencia de 
trabajadores contratados en la plantilla, el capital humano, etc. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Privatizaciones, eficiencia, indices de Malmquist  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
aking into consideration the privatisation policy that has emerged in 
recent decades, significant researches have been carried out to 
compare the efficiency of public and private companies. The general 
conclusions of such researches have established that private companies 
are more efficient than public companies within competitive frameworks, 
although this is not unanimous. However, there is a drop regarding the 
evolution of these companies over the years. In view of this, the present 
research tries to deal with the analysis of efficiency from a dynamic 
perspective, and to evaluate the process of changes occurring between the 
starting point (1990) and the finishing point (1998). 
T
The use of static efficiency indexes, for the purpose of establishing the 
evolution of productivity over the years, is clearly inefficient in fulfilling this 
purpose (Cuadras, Fernández and Rosés (2002), given that if we compared 
these indicators at different moments, we would be relating the efficiency 
of each company with the limit established for each of the periods, so the 
possible technological evolution would be obviated. Alternatively, another 
way to analyse this evolution is to take into consideration the growth rate 
of total or global factor productivity, and its decomposition. This allows us 
to determine the extent to which such growth is due to the technical 
progress or only to the production efficiency of the company, as well as the 
influence of the variable returns to scale (Orea, 2001)1. The so-called 
Malmquist indexes, based on the distance functions2, are an appropriate 
instrument for the measurement of these variations. More particularly, the 
Malmquist indices show the evolution of total factor productivity in a 
specific period of time, based on the information included in a data panel. 
Consequently, these indices provide the necessary tools to answer the 
following questions: Is the evolution of efficiency over the years less 
favourable in public companies than in private companies? Does efficiency 
improves to a larger extent in the case of privatised companies? Does the 
uneven evolution depend on business strategy factors?  
 
2. THEORETICAL APPROACH  
 
aves, Christensen and Diwert (1982) were the first authors to use 
the concept of distance function within the framework of the 
Malmquist index, which was initially defined in the context of the consumer 
C
                                                 
1 In Álvarez Pinilla (2001). 
2 According to the OECD (2001), the input-oriented distance function is based on 
the consideration that the inefficiency is related to the reduction that can be made 
in the use of the inputs, considering the possibilities of production to reach a 
specific output level. Moreover, Zofío (2001a) develops the consideration of 
distance functions in the Malmquist indices. 
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theory. These authors established the differences in productivity included 
in the Malmquist index, as well as the differences in the minimum volume 
of necessary inputs to reach a specific product (input-oriented) or the 
differences in the maximum product that can be obtained based on specific 
amounts of factors (output-oriented)3. 
As stated by Coelli, Prasada and Batesse (2000) and Pastor (1995)4, this 
instrument has the advantage of not presuming that the analysed decision 
units are efficient, unlike the Törnquist indices, which consider that these 
do not present inefficiency in production5, so any advance in the total 
factor productivity is attributed to technical progress. Such an advantage 
of the Malmquist indices, jointly with the fact that price information is not 
necessary, becomes specially interesting when the analysis is focused on 
or includes, as is the case, public organizations or companies (in which the 
purpose of their activities is not necessarily the maximisation of profits).  
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that it allows the decomposition of the 
productivity index into technological advances or changes in the production 
efficiency, the latter aspect being the core objective of this research. From 
a different perspective, bearing in mind that it is a non-parametric method, 
it is neither necessary to specify a functional form nor to make 
suppositions of distribution for the error term. 
All these considerations are supported by the growing use of this kind of 
indices, as proven by their inclusion in the productivity measurement 
manual published by the OECD in the year 2001 (OECD, 2001). 
The calculation of Malmquist indices can be carried out on the basis of 
different approaches. The option initially chosen herein is the one based on 
the original definition by Caves, Christiansen and Diewert (1982), taken up 
again by Färe, Grosskopf, Norris and Zhang (1994) 6, as established by 
Coelli, Prasada and Batesse (2000). These authors suggest a method to 
calculate the indices based on the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which 
will become the axis of the present research. However, some innovations 
are introduced: On the one hand, an input-orientation has been chosen, 
and on the other hand, we will widen this initial approach to introduce a 
more detailed decomposition of it, considering from a productive 
perspective the possibility that the efficient companies could not be 
operating in the optimum production scale7, and therefore the existence of 
variable returns to scale is proposed. 
                                                 
3 Pastor Monsálvez (1995) 
4 Berg, Førsund and Jansen (1992) allowed for the first time the presence of 
inefficient units when combining the distance function with the efficiency measures 
of Farrel, and it is in fact measured as the inverse of it. Within a parametric 
environment, Nixhimizu, M. and Page, J. (1982) take the credit for considering the 
presence of inefficiency for the first time. 
5 However, there is a relationship between the Malmquist index and the Törnquvst 
index: "Caves et al. (1982) prove that under certain general conditions, the 
geometric mean of two of the Malmquist productivity indices equals the quotient of 
the Törnquvst output and input indices, whose calculation only requires the input, 
output and price data observed, with no need of estimates" (Pastor, 1995). 
6 Caves, Christiansen, and Diewert (1982) offer a definition of the Malmquist 
indices that is subsequently reintroduced by Färe, Grosskopf, Norris and Zhang 
(1994), as stated by Coelli, Prasada and Batesse (2000); Zofío (2001b) or 
Grosskopf (2003). 
7 Zofío, J.L. (2001a) 
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According to Zofío(2001), and Quirós and Picazo (2001), the definition of 
the Malmquist indices can be made in the following terms: The starting 
point is a group of production possibilities, St: 
( ){ } Tt ,...,1        ,y introducecan  xy,xS ttttt ==  
where: xt = Inputs vector in t. 
 yt = Outputs vector in t. 
Assuming that such a group complies with the requirements set up by 
Shephard (1970), we can establish an input distance function, whose 
inverse represents a measure of technical efficiency. 
( ) ( ){ }Ttititititi SyxyxD ∈>= ,/:0sup, θθθ  
This function takes values ranging between zero and one. Thus, when a 
decision unit is efficient, its distance function will be one, and if it is 
inefficient, its value will be lower than one and the higher its inefficiency 
level is, the nearer to zero it will be. In that case, and as a factor-oriented 
radial indicator, we could conclude that it is possible to reduce the use of 
inputs in the proportion included between the value of the distance 
function and one. 
 
The so-defined distance functions constitute the foundations to create the 
Malmquist productivity indices. 
( ) ( )( )1111 ,,,,, ++++ = tititi
t
i
t
i
t
it
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i yxD
yxDyxyxM  
where ( )tititi yxD ,  represents the distance function of the company i during 
the period t (taking the technology of the period t as a reference), taking 
values between zero and one. On the other hand, ( )11 ++ ttt , iii yxD  is the 
distance function establishing a comparison of productivity of the company 
i during the period t+1, with respect to the technology of the period t, that 
is to say, the proportional variation that should occur in the input vector in 
t+1 to be over the frontier in t. 
An index higher than 1 indicates that the total factor productivity has 
grown from period t to period t+1; values lower than 1 imply a decrease 
with respect to the most efficient units; and, finally, when the index takes 
value 1, it means a stable situation.  
Likewise, this index can be calculated taking technology in t rather than 
technology in t+1 as a reference. Choosing one basis or the other implies, 
particularly in the cases where technological change occurs quite fast, 
important changes in the results. That is the reason why Färe, Grosskopf, 
Norris and Zhang (1994) suggest the calculation of an index as the 
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geometric mean of the previous two, therefore correcting the possible 
biases introduced by the election of a base or reference technology. 
This index can also be expressed as follows: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) (
  Change. Efficiency Productive*Change calTechnologi                       
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That is to say, we decompose the Malmquist index, that measures the total 
factor productivity change, into two elements: The first one 
( ( )111, +++ tttt , iii yxTC ) indicates the change occurred between the periods and 
t+1 in the “technological level”, which would allow “to obtain a higher 
quantity of products without modifying the quantity of applied factors”8 (it 
graphically corresponds to a displacement of the frontier function). 
Whereas, ( )111, +++ tttttt
                                                
,,, iiiii yxyxTEC  shows the variation undergone by the 
productive efficiency of the company, that is to say, if this is close to the 
best possible behaviours within the observed sample, i.e. to the frontier 
(also known as catching up process), as a result of its specific capacity, or 
on the contrary it moves away from it or keeps the same distance. Like in 
the general case of the Malmquist index, when these factors take a value 
that is higher, equal or lower than one, this indicates an increase, a 
decrease or a stagnation respectively in the specific aspect.  
This component includes the evolution of technical or productive efficiency 
and the technological change with a great precision when there are 
constant returns to scale. However, in the case where the sample 
presents variable returns to scale, these elements will show different 
meanings: Productive efficiency can be decomposed into two elements: 
pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency. And what we could call 
"technological change when there are constant returns", which corresponds 
to the variation in the productivity of those companies being efficient 
during the two periods under consideration9. Thus, as the observation of 
the sample indicates that decision-making units present variable returns to 
scale, as is this case, this element should be incorporated into the 
research. 
Nevertheless, the consideration of the existence of variable returns to scale 
in the Malmquist indices has been subject to an important controversy in 
the economic literature. In fact, authors such as Coelli, Prasada and 
Batesse (2000) are uncertain that these are exactly measuring the total 
factor productivity change when non-constant returns to scale are 
considered; it would not correspond to a productivity index, because this 
would not verify, from an axiomatic approach, the property of homogeneity 
–proportionality. However, the recent advances in this field allow for the 
development of distance functions that take the existence of such returns 
into consideration when data indicates so, while the Malmquist index does 
 
8 Quirós and Picazo (2001). 
9 Given that they are technically efficient, the increase in productivity is only due to 
the change occurred in the technological level from one period to the other.  
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not lose representativeness. In fact, Grosskpf (2003) concludes that there 
is not any problem in considering variable returns to scale, provided that 
the interpretation of results is in keeping with the criterion used for its 
calculation. This way, it is necessary to pay special attention to the 
interpretation of the so-called “scale efficiency change”, as well as the 
concept of technological change, due to the fact that the different 
alternatives imply different meanings. 
Particularly, as we pointed out previously, the following analysis focuses on 
the decomposition of the Malmquist index suggested by Färe, Grosskopf, 
Norris and Zhang -FGNZ- (1994) and subsequently developed by Färe, 
Grosskopg and Lovell (1994), actually the “most popular decomposition” of 
the same. Within this framework, the component related to the input from 
the changes in the operation scale to the variations in productivity, refers 
to the change experienced by the efficiency of the production scale, this 
being the result of the comparison of the scale efficiency in the two periods 
considered. That is to say that it compares the productivity obtained by the 
assessed company in the efficient frontier, considering its scale of 
operations, with the one obtained in the most efficient production scale 
that obtained the maximum productivity observed, therefore determining 
its change from one period to the following one. From an analytical point of 
view, this change in the scale efficiency can be calculated as the quotient 
between the returns to scale and the technical change with respect to the 
optimum production scale. 
What we have called “technical change” corresponds to the technological 
boost incorporated by the efficient companies in the periods considered or 
the change in potential productivity, which Grosskopf (2003) defined as 
“change in the maximum average product between t and t+1”. In this 
case, any change undertaken in the total factor productivity corresponds 
completely to the technological process, since it is not due to any 
improvement in productive efficiency (which is equal to 1 in all cases), and 
this is the aspect included in the expression “technological change” 
suggested by FGNZ (1994). 
In graphical terms, this interpretation is shown in figure 1, where we 
assume there is only one output (y) and only one input (x). If we try to 
evaluate the change that has taken place in the total factor productivity 
from period 0 to period 1, what we are doing is comparing the situation 
(xi0, y i0) with (xi1, y i1). The change undertaken can be decomposed, as 
previously seen, into various elements: On the one hand, what we have 
called “technical change”, which corresponds to the displacement occurred 
in the frontier of the group of production possibilities considering constant 
scale returns, for the efficient decision-making units. The evolution of 
technical efficiency refers to the comparison between the distance existing 
between ( )00 , ii yx  and ( )00 ~, ii yx  and between ( )11, ii yx  and ( )11 ~, ii yx . Whereas 
the comparison between the distances between ( )00 ~ *0*0, ii yx  and , and 
between 
/ ii xy( )11 ~ *1*1, ii yx  and corresponds to the change produced in the 
scale efficiency. 
/ ii xy
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FIGURE 1 
TFP change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Zofío, J.L. (2001) 
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We cannot ignore the fact that the state of the question does not end with 
this suggestion by FGNZ. Zofío (2001b) reviewed the related literature in 
order to make his own suggestion to establish a clear relationship between 
the decompositions of the Malmquist index suggested so far. 
Among the most recent contributions, this author highlights the one made 
by Färe, Grosskpf, Norris and Zhang, referred to herein, and the one 
established by Ray and Desli (1997): The main characteristic of this last 
suggestion is that it is based on variable returns to scale. On the basis of 
this assumption, the productivity index is divided into the following 
components: the evolution of the technological change (considering 
variable returns to scale, unlike the suggestion made by FGNZ, which 
refers only to the technological change undertaken by the efficient 
companies), the change in pure technical efficiency and the contribution of 
the returns to scale to the productivity change (again there is a difference 
with respect to the previous proposal). Initially, Ray and Desli (1997) call 
this factor “scale efficiency change”. However, this conception was directly 
subject to review by Färe, Grosskopg and Norris (1997), since it does not 
constitute a change of it under the same terms as the ones established for 
the technical change and the pure technical efficiency. This is the reason 
why the interpretations carried out refer to such a change as the 
contribution of the returns to scale to the total factor productivity change. 
The last contribution of Zofío consist of the development of a relationship 
between the decompositions carried out by FGNZ (1994) and Ray and Desli 
(1997), in such a way that as from the suggested decomposition, all the 
previous components can be derived. 
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The rejection of the decomposition by Ray and Desli is mainly due to the 
fact that the essential aims of this subject matter are not related to the 
technological change, although some remarks have been made in this 
respect, but to the productive efficiency of companies that, as it has been 
established, constitutes the only objective of companies that cannot be 
obviated by public companies, regardless that other purposes of economic 
politics must be added as well as the decomposition in the pure technical 
efficiency change and the scale efficiency. 
And finally, the most recent proposal surpasses the intentions of the 
present piece of research, so that considering the complexity of the 
proposal and the contribution of information that is not so important for 
the interests of this study, its application to subsequent researches has 
been postponed. 
In this context, the working hypothesis to be contrasted is whether 
there are differences in the evolution of total or global factor 
productivity depending on the fact that the company is private or 
has any share in public capital. Moreover, in the case that the answer is 
affirmative, we must determine the extent to which productive 
efficiency and its components (pure technical efficiency and scale 
efficiency) have an influence on this uneven behaviour. 
 
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1.  Calculation and decomposition of the Malmquist Indices. 
 
he data used to answer these questions corresponds to the following 
variables: EMPLOYMENT, CAPITAL (CAPITAL GOODS)10 and 
PRODUCTION after the deduction of the price effect, for the years 1990 
and 1998. 
T
Using the computer program DEAP, we can calculate the Malmquist 
indices, which show us the evolution of total factor productivity during the 
nineties in the companies included in the Encuesta sobre Estrategias 
Empresariales, ESEE (Survey on Business Strategies) that have maintained 
their participation in it during the period11, taking into consideration the 
existence of variable returns to scale among them and with an input 
orientation. According to this approach, the index can be decomposed into 
three elements: 
Change in TFP = "Technological change" * Pure technical efficiency 
change* Scale efficiency change 
Table 1 shows a summary of the results obtained, including the means of 
each of the categories considered, as well as the statistical significance of 
                                                 
10 Martín-Marcos and Suárez (1997). 
11 It is worth noticing that the calculation of Malmquist indices requires a complete 
or balanced data panel. 
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the difference of means among the categories. Hence, the sample has 
been structured into two groups: on the one hand, those companies whose 
capital or a part of whose capital is in public hands (public companies) –
with a total of 18 companies, 2.33 percent of the sample–, and on the 
other hand, the private companies –representing the remaining 97.67 
percent–. In the case of the latter, an interesting subgroup has also been 
considered, privatised companies, whose distinctive feature is that these 
were public in 1990 whereas by 1998 they had became privately owned –a 
total of 1.32 percent of the private companies–. Consequently, a residual 
subgroup was made up of those companies that could be called 
“traditional” private companies (including those companies that were 
completely in private hands in 1990 and still were in 1998). 
The simple observation of these results12 leads us to suggest that in a 
context in which all the groups have increased their productivity level, the 
evolution of the total factor productivity in public companies has been less 
favourable (with a growth of 47.7 percent for the period) than in the total 
of the sample (59.6 percent). In turn, the average Malmquist index for the 
group is slightly below the private companies, although very close, 
considering the importance of this kind of entities included in the sample 
(with a growth of 58.4 percent). And finally, the privatised companies, 
which have developed the most, have undergone a productivity growth of 
175.5 percent. Furthermore, the variability within the group tends to grow, 
as the improvement of the group is higher.  
The analysis carried out by Laurin and Bozec (2001) also considers the 
change in apparent productivity of the factors between 1981 and 1991 in 
the Canadian railway sector. They state similarly that such productivity 
undergoes a higher growth in private companies, and when a public 
company is privatised, its positive evolution is above the one undergone by 
its competitor.  
 
                                                 
12 Similar treatment to the one carried out by Pedraja, Salinas and Salinas (2002). 
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TABLE 1 
TFP evolution and descomposición. Malmquist Index. 
 
PTF 
Change 
Technical 
Change 
Productive 
Efficiency 
Change 
Pure 
Technical 
Efficiency 
Change 
Scale 
Efficiency 
Change 
Public 
Enterprises 
1,447 
(0,703) 
2,202 
(0,311) 
0,686 
(0,381) 
0,667 
(0,430) 
1,147 
(0,379) 
Private 
Enterprises 
1,584 
(1,102) 
1,831 
(0,320) 
0,880 
(0,682) 
0,900 
(0,439) 
1,022 
(0,477) 
Privatised 
Enterprises 
2,755 
(1,421) 
2,189 
(0,169) 
1,275 
(0,703) 
1,410 
(0,650) 
0,892 
(0,196) 
Total 
1,596 
(1,106) 
1,844 
(0,325) 
0,881 
(0,678) 
0,901 
(0,446) 
1,023 
(0,473) 
ANOVA public-
private 
       F-statistic 
       P-value 
 
0,334 
0,564 
 
 
 
1,520 
0,219 
 
5,114 
0,024 
 
1,270 
0,260 
ANOVA private-
privatised 
       F-statistic 
       P-value 
 
11,050 
0,01 
  
3,314 
0,069 
 
13,322 
0,000 
 
0,734 
0,392 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
However, in view of the data, we cannot state that this is a significant 
difference13. In fact, the specification of an analysis of means 
differentiation, where the change undergone in the total factor productivity 
is the dependent variable –always bearing in mind the questions set out 
previously regarding its representativeness– and the ownership (public or 
private) is the factor, leads us to conclude that such a significance does not 
exist, so the ownership does not result as a conditioning element of the 
evolution of this productivity. In contrast, comparing the privatised 
companies with those that are strictly private, we can see that they have 
                                                 
13 Against the analysis carried out by Pedraja, Salinas and Salinas (2002), we try to 
verify here that the differences observed in the average values estimated by 
categories are significant from the statistical point of view.  
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developed in a different way as a consequence of their condition (the 
ANOVA analysis is interesting in this respect). 
This more favourable evolution can be the consequence of eliminating the 
characteristic elements of public companies (diversity of objectives and 
variation of these over time, “light” budgetary stringencies, concatenated 
agency relationships, etc.), which makes them concentrate their efforts on 
improving their productivity and become competitive. At the same time, 
they correct the differences of levels with respect to private companies, as 
it has been proven by the non-parametric analysis carried out at an 
aggregated level, and grouping them as goods of final or intermediate 
consumption and capital goods, with limited exceptions14. These results 
with an intermediate aggregation level also become corroborated by means 
of the application of the same information of econometric analyses15. 
In order to determine the extent to which the productive efficiency is 
responsible for this differential behaviour, we can turn to the 
decomposition of the Malmquist index (table 1), and to the successive 
analyses of difference of means carried out for each of the components, 
taking as a factor the consideration that the company has been privatised 
during the nineties (1990-1998) or has maintained its private ownership 
throughout the decade. However, in this context, we must take into 
consideration that, regarding what we have called “technological change”, 
it has no sense to compare the evolution in the private and in the public 
context, as it actually refers to the technological boost occurred in the 
reference efficient companies or leading companies, which can be public or 
private, regardless of the ownership of the company in question. 
Nevertheless, if we stop to determine which are the efficient companies 
and their ownership (obtained in the comparative efficiency analysis in 
public, private and privatised companies from a static perspective by 
means of the non-parametric analysis DEA), we can observe that all are 
private entities. In other words, the guidelines related to technical change 
are characterised by private companies, which indicate that public 
companies are clearly a step behind when compared with them. We shall 
have the opportunity to stress this point later on. 
From this perspective, productive efficiency represents as the essential 
explanatory factor of the differences observed in the uneven evolution of 
privatised companies and those maintaining their private ownership 
throughout the decade. More specifically, this is due to pure technical 
efficiency, where the difference between both categories of companies 
reaches 0.506. In fact, the evolution of scale efficiency during this wide 
period has led to an increase in private companies, against a decrease in 
the case of privatised ones, although it is not significant. 
In conclusion, privatised companies present a more favourable 
evolution in terms of productivity than private companies, which is 
also statistically important, and occurs despite the fact that they 
                                                 
14 Conclusions in the analyses by sectors cannot be generalised for certain. 
However, in most of the cases, when it is observed that public companies have a 
higher level of productive efficiency than private companies, it usually exists only 
one company fulfilling this condition, so we could question its representativeness. 
15 Appendix 4 includes the results obtained with the parametric methodology of 
panel data. 
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are far from the optimum production scale, thanks to the 
significant improvement in the allocation of resources, and 
considering their size. 
 Although from an aggregated perspective, the ownership (public or private 
company) does not imply a condition in the evolution of global factor 
productivity, one of its components, pure technical efficiency, does. 
Regarding pure technical efficiency, the significant difference of means is 
shown as favourable to private companies. In other words, public 
companies have undergone a worse evolution as regards the allocation of 
resources, due to their size and technological level. The explanatory 
reasons of this behaviour are related to the characteristics of the public 
companies, that is to say, the diversity of objectives and the change of 
these over time, “concatenated” agency relationships, the greater influence 
exercised by the interest groups, “light” budgetary stringencies, etc. 
We can break down there change into two periods: 1990-1994 and 1994-
1998. In most cases (table 2) changes are more important in second 
period. 
Private enterprises have the best conduct in the first stage, when Spanish 
economy is in a crisis period. However, there are the privatised enterprises 
that behave in the best way between 1994 and 1998 (years of growth). 
The firms privatised between 1994 and 1998, the 50%, however had a 
better behaviour before its privatisation (table 3). 
 
TABLE 2 
TFP evolution and descomposition in 1990-1994 and 1994-1998. Malmquist Index. 
  
Public 
enterprises 
Privatised 
enterprises 
Private 
enterprises 
Productive Efficiency Change 0,986 0,680 1,073 
Pure Technical Efficiency 
Change 1,166 1,062 1,262 
Scale Efficiency Change 0,975 0,752 0,945 
1990-1994 
TFP Change 0,980 0,797 1,085 
Productive Efficiency Change 1,003 1,225 1,991 
Pure Technical Efficiency 
Change 0,770 1,660 1,130 
Scale Efficiency Change 1,642 1,184 1,241 
1994-1998 
TFP Change 2,139 2,518 2,227 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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TABLE 3 
Technical Efficiency Change in Public Enterprises 
Technical Efficiency Change 
Enterprise
1990-1994 1994-1998 
34 1,097 2,27
445 1,084 0,597
1156 3,439 0,69
1220 0,746 1,922
1309 2,573 0,805
1703 1,098 1,166
1714 0,483 2,792
1730 1,744 0,46
2053 4,909 0,182
2063 0,335 5,716
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
We have already mentioned that the technological change was not a 
specific analysis of the present analysis, although the global analysis of the 
sample has allowed us to anticipate that the companies leading the 
technical change are private. However, we can take a step forward and, 
based on the analysis of Malmquist indices as have been herein defined, 
we can establish whether there is a difference of means among public and 
private companies.  
From a point of view, we can expect private companies to have superiority, 
if we take into consideration that their only purpose is to maximise profits, 
and that R&D investment and technological change are some of the 
elements on which the competitiveness of companies, regions and 
countries to a large extent is based. Consequently, private companies 
should be those experiencing a more significant growth at a technological 
level. 
However, there are also arguments leading us to believe that the public 
sector is the most dynamic sector in this respect. Therefore, regarding the 
technological change, it is interpreted as the result of R&D investment 
carried out by the company (on the contrary, the existing diversity of 
technology becomes apparent as improvements in productive efficiency, 
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and not as a technical change)16. This is worth noticing given that research 
and development activities can be classified as a public asset, to the extent 
that they fulfil the established requirements: on the one hand, these are 
joint-offer assets, R&D results can be applied with a minimum cost once it 
has been materialised and the available offer in the market does not 
decrease as the number of users consuming the total volume offered 
increases; and on the other hand, their exclusion due to the price seems to 
be difficult, unless there is protection by the public sector (for example, via 
the patent system). This consideration as a public asset would lead us to 
conclude that the private sector tends to underinvest in such activities. 
Awareness of this reality by the economic authorities often makes public 
companies play a facilitating role in this task, reaching the leading position 
regarding R&D in the business system, and, consequently, the technical 
change boost within this should be superior to the private sector’s (this 
fact is clear after the observation of data from the ESEE, where 
expenditure on R&D in relation to the volume of production represents 
2.6% in public companies, against 0.69% in private companies). 
In order to contrast empirically which of these arguments is in keeping 
with the behaviour of the companies comprising our sample, we divide it 
into two groups: public and private companies (differentiating the 
privatised companies), including in these sub-samples a decision-making 
unit corresponding to the average company; and then, we calculate 
independent Malmquist indices for each of them. This is the method we use 
to obtain the average technical change experienced by the efficient public 
companies on the one hand, and the technical change experienced by the 
efficient private companies on the other. 
The results gained, shown in table 4, reveal that, on average terms, 
efficient private companies corresponding to the one representing this 
category are those with the highest growing rhythm, and particularly the 
privatised companies within this group. Consequently, the theory that 
private companies whose main purpose is the maximisation of profits have 
undergone a higher growth in technology is becoming stronger. More 
specifically within this group, privatised companies resulted in being the 
most dynamic ones. However, if we observe the investment effort carried 
out by ones and the others, we can see that public companies allocate a 
considerably higher percentage of their turnover to research and 
development (2.5 percent against 0.69 percent of private companies: table 
3). 
 
                                                 
16 Maudos, Pastor, Serrano (2000). 
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TABLE 4. 
Technological Change 
 Technological change 
Public Enterprise 0,939 
Private Enterprise 2,003 
Privatised Enterprise 3,687 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
In other words, as public companies make a greater effort in R&D, the 
entities leading the technological change in the Spanish manufacturing 
industry are those of private ownership, and specially those that previously 
were of public condition, as stated by Martín and Velázquez (1993), we 
must bear in mind the differences between research and development, and 
innovation. 
 
3.2.  Second Stage analysis. 
 
n the basis of the conclusions reached so far, we could consider 
whether the differential behaviour between public and private 
companies can be related to the uneven business strategy they follow17. In 
this context, mainly according to Melle (1999), we can set out a new 
hypothesis: the different evolution of public and private companies 
is a consequence, at least partially, of the differences existing in 
aspects like export, level of competitiveness perceived by the 
companies, R&D investment, to which we referred to previously, 
human capital, contracting of employees, or the externalisation of 
services (related to the organising flexibility of the firm), or the 
productive sector in which the company operates, so that all these 
variables have a significant influence on the changing level 
occurred in productivity and its different components18.  
O
Table 5 shows, on average for the year 1998, the behaviour of efficient 
companies, public companies and the group of private companies related 
to these items, so that we can compare the different behaviours. 
 
                                                 
17 This is a similar approach to the one carried out for the case of export and non-
export companies in the research developed by De Jorge and Suárez (2004). 
18 Pedraja, Salinas and Salinas (2002) carried out a similar study considering the 
influence of human capital and public productive capital over the evolution of the 
productivity of private productive factors. 
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TABLE 5 
Efficient Company Features (1998). 
 
 
 
Empresa 
eficiente
Empresa
pública
Empresa
privada
Cuota de mercado 19,11 41 14,15
Competencia 4,6 2,25 3,7
Gastos en I+D 0,53 2,5 0,69
Exportaciones 34,
 
 
06 42,54 19,86
Personal eventual 2,43 7,11 16,94
Capital humano 23 13,81 10,14
Servicios exteriores 10,98 15,77 14,48
Tamaño 
(total personal) 2401,00 1007,88 205,13
20,
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
In order to contrast this hypothesis, we set out an exercise structured in 
two stages: Firstly, we try to determine whether there is any difference of 
means that is statistically significant in the variables of public and private 
companies. Now, by means of the tobit analysis, we will determine if these 
are determining variables in the evolution of the company’s efficiency. 
The ANOVA analysis shows that the values of all variables, except for the 
external services, are different depending on whether the company is 
public or private. Therefore, it is considered that each of these categories 
has a different business strategy, defined under these terms, by means of 
which we try to explain the uneven evolution of its productivity throughout 
the nineties. 
Considering these relationships, we estimate a tobit censored regression 
model. The dependent variable will be productive efficiency, technical 
efficiency and scale efficiency respectively. Given that this variation is 
between zero and one in the event that the company is far from the most 
efficient companies, equals one if its relative situation is maintained, and is 
higher than one in the case of improvement, we have a variable that 
always maintains higher-than-zero values. 
In this sense, the results of the tobit regression (included in table 4) reveal 
that in the determining of the technical efficiency evolution, only the 
variables contracting of temporary employees and external services are 
representative, both showing a negative influence; on the other hand, the 
variables having a positive influence on the change of scale efficiency are: 
human capital, export turnover and contracting of temporary employees, 
with a 95-percent confidence level. 
On the contrary, for the most general case of productive efficiency, the 
afore-mentioned variables are not significant for its evolution in either of 
the cases. These relationships are kept in the event of not considering the 
ownership factor19. 
                                                 
19 See Appendix 5. 
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 TABLE 6. 
Tobit  regresión results. 
 
Malmquist 
Index 
Productive 
Efficiency 
Change 
Pure 
Technical 
Efficiency 
Change 
Scale 
Efficiency 
Change 
Ownership 
-0,427 
(0,141) 
-0,232 
(0,201) 
-0,179 
(0,125) 
-0,042 
(0,728) 
Market quota 
0,003 
(0,198) 
-0,0004 
(0,767) 
-0,0007 
(0,413) 
-0,0002 
(0,836) 
Competitiveness 
-0,004 
(0,877) 
-0,004 
(0,772) 
0,006 
(0,562) 
-0,018 
(0,065) 
R&D expenses 
-0,003 
(0,880) 
-0,008 
(0,581) 
0,0001 
(0,168) 
-0,018 
(0,056) 
Employees 
training 
0,010 
(0,011) 
0,004 
(0,097) 
-0,124 
(0,168) 
0,004 
(0,019) 
Exports 
0,006 
(0,001) 
0,008 
(0,442) 
0,0003 
(0,676) 
0,001 
(0,034) 
Temporary 
contracts 
-0,002 
(0,431) 
-0,0003 
(0,838) 
-0,0003 
(0,000) 
0,005 
(0,000) 
External services 
-0,007 
(0,215) 
-0,005 
(0,124) 
-0,005 
(0,022) 
0,0001 
(0,975) 
Constant 
1,499 
(0,000) 
0,942 
(0,000) 
1,049 
(0,000) 
0,919 
(0,000) 
Pseudo R2 0,0116 0,0047 0,029 0,0468 
Source: Owned elaborated. 
Likewise, the trends are maintained only if we include in the model dummy 
variables representing the activity sector in which the decision unit 
operates (so that they take value 1 when the company belongs to the 
sector, and value 0 in the opposite case). More precisely, 19 sectorial 
dummies are considered (20 activity branches in which the manufacturing 
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industry is structured20, except for one -Beverages- in order to avoid 
multicollinearity, thus what we measure in practice with the coefficient of 
these variables is the influence of the sector with respect to the one 
omitted. The result reveals a limited influence of the sector in determining 
efficiency, although the explicative charge of the model is slightly 
increased, according to the information contributed by the pseudo R2. 
Before rejecting the relationship between the changes undertaken in the 
efficiency levels and the strategy variables already defined, the Spearman 
Rank Correlation Test allows us to contribute more information to try and 
establish whether there is a correlation, and in which sense among the 
different strategy variables and the changes in productivity and efficiency. 
In general, if we observe the Spearman correlation tests (table 7) we can 
conclude that the level of dependence of the changes occurred not only at 
the levels of scale efficiency, but also of technical and productive 
efficiency, and at the level of global productivity with respect to the 
variables included is relatively reduced. However, in many cases, the 
application of the test leads us to reject the null hypothesis that the indices 
are independent of the variables evaluated: Therefore, we can state that 
the change in technical efficiency is not independent of: 
 R&D expenses, as a negative correlation between both 
elements exists. This would indicate that the higher the 
technical efficiency change is, the lower the R&D investment. 
Considering that the improvement in technical efficiency is 
interpreted as the catching-up process, i.e. the result of the 
diffusion process of the existing technology (and not the 
technological change in a strict sense, which would include the 
result of the research and development investment), the sign of 
this correlation seems to be logical. The companies investing 
lower amounts in R&D are those “copying” to a large extent the 
available technology and this allows them to improve their 
technical efficiency. Likewise, this inverse relationship is 
reflected in the coefficient of the tobit regression, although it is 
not significant in this case. 
 
 
                                                 
20 The ESEE decomposes the manufacturing activity into 20 productive sectors or 
activity branches: Meat industry; Food and tobacco production; Beverages; Textile 
and clothes; Leather and shoes; Wood industry; Paper industry; Edition and 
graphic arts; Chemical products; Rubber and plastic products; Mineral non-metallic 
products; Ferrous and non-ferrous metals; Metallic products; Farming and 
industrial machinery; Office machinery; Electrical machinery and material; Motor 
vehicles; Other transport material; Furniture industry and Other manufacturing 
industries. On the other hand, these sectors can also be grouped into three 
categories: final consumer goods, intermediate consumer goods and capital goods. 
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TABLE 7 
Spearman Correlation Test 
 
Malmquist 
Index 
Productive 
Efficiency 
Change 
Pure 
Technical 
Efficiency 
Change 
Scale 
Efficiency 
Change 
Market quota 
0,1684 
(0,0000) 
0,0100 
(0,7908) 
-0,0688 
(0,0665) 
0,1162 
(0,0019) 
Competitiveness 
-0,0143 
(0,6919) 
-0,0081 
(0,8230) 
0,0467 
(0,1959) 
-0,0833 
(0,0207) 
R&D expenses 
0,1431 
(0,0001) 
-0,0605 
(0,0934) 
-0,1756 
(0,0000) 
0,1957 
(0,0000) 
Employees 
training 
0,1461 
(0,0000) 
0,0270 
(0,4535) 
-0,0469 
(0,1927) 
0,1283 
(0,0004) 
Exports 
0,2679 
(0,0000) 
0,0554 
(0,1204) 
-0,1307 
(0,0008) 
0,2282 
(0,0000) 
Temporary 
contracts 
0,0058 
(0,8721) 
0,0304 
(0,2736) 
0,1763 
(0,0000) 
0,1833 
(0,0000) 
External 
services 
0,3152 
(0,0000) 
-0,0175 
(0,7264) 
-0,2488 
(0,0000) 
0,3520 
(0,0000) 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 The percentage of exports over turnover. In this case, the 
negative relationship between the level of exports and the 
change undertaken in technical efficiency, proven not only in 
the Spearman coefficient, but also in the tobit analysis 
(although it is not significant in the latter), does not seem to be 
so evident. In fact, efficient companies, on average, sell 34 
percent of their products to foreign markets. However, public 
companies register a higher percentage, which could partly 
explain their trajectory being worse, always on average terms 
when a specific limit is surpassed. Nevertheless, private 
companies (in keeping with the tradition of the Spanish 
businesspeople) show a much more reduced trend towards 
export, only near to 20 percent of their turnover. 
 The consideration of the influence of human capital in the 
change of technical efficiency provides controversial results, 
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given that between both variables there is a negative 
correlation included in the Spearman test (not significant and 
questionable from a theoretical perspective), whereas the 
influence included in the censored regression is positive 
(although it is neither significant). In both cases, apart from not 
being significant, the relationship shown is very reduced, in fact 
the lowest among the variables considered. Therefore, the 
investment in human capital has an influence on some higher 
levels of efficiency, but its contribution to the evolution of the 
same is neither univocal nor definitive. 
 The contracting of temporary employees as a percentage of the 
total (negative relationship established not only by the 
Spearman rank coefficient, but also by the regression analysis, 
where it is statistically significant). The higher the percentage 
corresponding to the temporary contracts over the total of the 
staff is, the lower the change produced in technical efficiency. 
That is to say, the argument supporting that the establishment 
of long-term relationships between the employee and the 
company increases its level of efficiency becomes more 
important. This relationship can reflect a higher investment in 
human capital carried out by the employee him/herself or by 
the company, before the improvement expectations in his/her 
position, which would contribute to clarify the allocation of 
human capital to the evolution of technical efficiency. 
 A verification of this event is found in the comparison between 
the data of efficient and non-efficient companies, either private 
or public (table 3). Against 2.43 percent represented in the 
technically efficient companies, public companies reach 7.2 
percent, which is even higher in private companies, reaching 
16.94 percent. This data is only the reflection of a reality of 
Spanish economy, which has just perceived a notable increase 
in the number of labour contracts in recent years, considerably 
drifting from the parameter of European mean and generating 
an increasing social concern. In fact, the most recent labour 
market reforms have tried to tackle this instability. 
 And the contracting of external services that, as well as the 
previous one, is significant in the tobit regression (likewise, 
with a negative correlation). The higher flexibility in the 
organisation of production reflected in a higher contracting of 
services outside is negatively related to the change that 
occurred in the level of technical efficiency. On average, 
efficient companies present an externalisation (calculated by 
means of the percentage implied by the contracting of external 
services over the total turnover) of almost 11 percent, whereas 
private companies reach 14.5 percent and public companies, 
partly explaining again their lower technical efficiency, reach 
15.75 percent. As is set out in the annual analysis, we must 
take these results with caution, as they represent a wide range 
of tertiary activities within the group of externalised services, 
although the existence of this negative relationship could be 
justified by means of the vertical integration. The control of 
several production levels of the decision-making unit allows the 
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adjustment of decisions regarding the final objectives of the 
company to a larger extent, which could contribute to a higher 
increase of its technical efficiency. 
 
On its part, the scale efficiency change shows a significant dependence of 
all estimated variables on the Spearman coefficient, while those variables 
depending on the tobit analysis increase in number. 
 A positive correlation with respect to the market quota is 
observed. Thus, the higher the market quota, the higher the 
efficiency level. In other words, those companies with a higher 
market power have been those whose size has approached 
closest to the optimum production scale. This is possibly the 
main reason that public companies are those experiencing a 
higher improvement in their scale efficiency, given that (as 
shown in table 3) such companies show a higher market quota 
(41 percent, in fact almost three times the one of private 
companies), although they are far from the parameter of 
efficient companies (with an average market quota of 19.11 
percent). 
 On the other hand, such a quota is positively correlated to the 
company size, which at the same time is considerably larger for 
public companies’. 
 On the contrary, when companies observe that the number of 
competitors with a significant market quota is high, the 
improvement produced in their scale efficiency tends to be 
worse. A priori, we can register a negative relationship between 
the variable market quota and the number of competitors: 
when the number of competitors with a significant market 
quota increases, their own quota tends to be lower, thus 
provoking a lower trend towards the improvement in scale 
efficiency21. This influence is also included in the regression 
analysis, where the coefficient is lower than zero and is very 
near to statistical significance. We could conclude that the 
competitiveness perceived by producers does not press towards 
the improvement in scale efficiency. This is due to the fact that, 
on average, the size of efficient companies is larger than the 
mean, and the presence of more competitors in the market and 
the distribution of the same make this size smaller, which 
makes the improvement of scale efficiency more difficult. In 
this sense, public companies, which are larger than private 
companies and have a lower number of recognised significant 
competitors, also on average terms, are more biased to 
improve their scale position. 
 R&D expenses show, in turn, a positive relationship with scale 
efficiency (not only in the regression but also in the Spearman 
coefficient). In other words, we can observe that, when a 
                                                 
21 Although this correlation for the sample considered is true, it is not significant. 
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company invests in research and development, it tends to 
approach its optimum level of production scale faster. 
 The training of employees is also an influential element in the 
change undertaken in scale efficiency; in fact, it contributes to 
it approaching the optimum size of production. 
 And finally, a higher flexibility of the company, expressed in 
terms of percentage representing temporary contracts of the 
staff, as well as the contracting of external services, represents 
a positive influence on the improvement of the scale level, as it 
is also reflected by the estimated equation (with statistical 
significance). We can conclude that, the more flexible the 
company is, the more easily it will be able to adapt itself to the 
economic events and consequently, to adapt its size to the 
optimum. In this sense, sales in external markets allow a more 
flexible adaptation, influencing on it positively. 
Concerning what occurs regarding the evolution of productive efficiency 
(considering constant returns to scale), where we cannot reject that it is 
independent of all the variables considered, the total factor productivity 
change (with the clarifications established regarding its representativeness 
due to the consideration of technical change representing the one occurred 
in the event of existence of constant returns to scale) presents a significant 
correlation with respect to virtually all variables (with the only exceptions 
of competence -probably due to the definition of this variable, as relevant 
competence level recognised by the companies- and the temporary 
employees).  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
rivate companies present a more favourable evolution than public 
companies (or, more specifically, a smaller step backwards) in their 
technical efficiency, which is statistically significant. This uneven behaviour 
can be due, among other factors, to elements related to their business 
strategy. The positive effects generated by the lower R&D expenses 
constitute proof of this, bearing in mind that, as a counterpart, we 
understand that private companies are applying technologies that are 
already available in the market, the lower volume of exports, and the 
contracting of external services, though the higher number of temporary 
contracts exerts an opposite effect. 
P
It is worth noticing that differential increase of total factor productivity, 
despite of this not being statistically significant, is favourable for private 
companies, unlike what occurs in the improvement in terms of scale 
efficiency, which favours public companies as a consequence of the 
positive effects generated by a higher market quota, the lower level of 
competence recognised by the companies, the higher volume of R&D 
expenses, the percentage superiority of exports, as well as the higher level 
of external services contracted. 
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Privatised companies present a more favourable evolution in terms of 
productivity than private companies, which is also statistically important, 
and occurs despite the fact that they are far from the optimum production 
scale, thanks to the significant improvement in the allocation of resources, 
and considering their size. 
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